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National governments throughout the Asia-Pacific Region have identified small and
medium enterprises as an important source of economic growth and employment.  In the
past, SME business strategies have focused on production, relying on their subcontracting
and sales contacts with large firms for technological innovation and marketing and on
abundant domestic labour forces for comparative advantage.  Recently, structural
problems in the region arising from the Japanese recession, currency appreciation and
rising labour costs have upset these relationships forcing SMEs to move offshore (DFI) to
restore cost competitiveness and to upgrade their internal technological and
organisational capacities to international standards in order to compete for contracts
within more open, international markets.
This paper analyses this process of change, analysing the development of SMEs within
four Asian countries using a six stage evolutionary model.  The majority of SMEs in
these countries are still in the earlier second (dependency) or third (internalisation)
stages.  The more advanced SMEs have moved into the fourth (externalisation) stage,
where firms develop independent technology and marketing capacities. To the extent that
localisation (stage five) had occurred, it involved local embedded relationships which had
limited scope for further internationalisation.  Little evidence of regional integration or
networking among SMEs was found.
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THE INTERNATIONALISATION PROCESS  OF ASIAN SMALL AND
MEDIUM FIRMS
INTRODUCTION
The second APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum) Small and Medium
Enterprise (SME) Ministerial meeting held in Adelaide, Australia in September 1995
established a joint action program for member countries aimed at encouraging
cooperative development among SMEs in the region. Statements emanating from the
1995 meeting and later developments in APEC have cast SMEs as new, independent
sources of growth and development of cooperative networks of such firms as the best
way of achieving their technological and exporting potential (APEC 1995).
SMEs played a significant but much overlooked role in the Asian ‘economic miracle’.
Their predominant role was as subcontracted suppliers of parts and components to large
assemblers of automobiles and electric equipment, often referred to as the ‘Japanese
model’,  or as OEM (original equipment manufacturers) which supplied anonymous
components and peripheral items to multinational computer and telecommunications
equipment corporations as in Taiwan.  Asian SMEs also provided a large range of low
cost consumer items which were distributed world-wide by large trading companies.
SMEs thus had a vital role in the long boom of post-war Asian development as flexible,
low cost suppliers of mature technology products and components.  This structure
encouraged a proliferation of small firms in the region with competitive advantages in
production efficiency and later original design capabilities (ODM).  They were able to
operate in a sheltered marketing environment with demand for their output largely
provided by large ‘parent’ firms, which contracted their output and provided
technological know-how.
This pleasant situation was shaken by a series of structural changes in Asian economies
culminating in the 1997 financial crises. Asian SMEs have faced rising costs driven by
Asia’s economic success with currency appreciation and rising labour costs making their
exports increasingly expensive.  SMEs use mature technologies and are relatively labour
intensive so labour shortages and rising wages in the Asian ‘dragons’ have particularly
affected such firms.  Economic recession has forced the large Japanese firms to broaden
their supply chains, sourcing increasingly on price which has broken many of the
sheltered contractual relationships with SMEs in Japan and Taiwan.  More generally,
technological changes towards computer controlled automation and small batch
production, and organisational changes including corporate downsizing with a subsequent
increased use of global subcontracting and collaborations have opened international
procurement to a wide range of companies (Meyanathan & Munter 1994: 3-4).
These changes provide SMEs with both threats and opportunities.  They have generally
responded to the threat aspects by improving technological efficiency or relocating to
lower wage countries in other parts of Asia.  However, the opening of supply contracts
provide new opportunities for those SMEs able to operate independently in competitive
international markets.  To achieve these opportunities, SMEs have to embrace
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organisational change both to improve their technological and managerial capabilities and
to expand their information sources and marketing outlets to provide the scale necessary
to operate in international markets.
As discussed in the following section, the network model is being identified as one which
can most appropriately meet these needs for SMEs.  This raises the question of what is
meant by the network approach when applied to Asian SMEs.  Both the Japanese
subcontracting model and the Taiwanese clusters around OEM-ODM firms have been
cited as early examples of networking.  However, in the western industrial organisation
literature networking refers to collaborative relationships between independent and often
competitive firms as well as to relationships with their clients and suppliers and is
increasingly associated with ‘globalisation’ or the integration of production and
marketing activities on an international scale.  It thus implies inter-firm relationships on a
much wider scale and of a very different nature to the Asian customer – supplier
networks.
In this paper, we investigate how SMEs in four selected Asian countries (Japan, Taiwan,
South Korea and Malaysia) have evolved through a six stage development model.  Stage
models are frequently used to explain the internationalisation process.  Models of SME
development have generally been adapted from more general large firm analyses.  This is
true in both western and Asian studies.  In the next section, a short summary of western
analyses of the internationalisation of SMEs is provided, evolving to the network stage.
A six stage Asian model is then developed reflecting Asian analyses of the same topic,
which incorporates the earlier sheltered stages of their development and the current stages
where they are exposed to international competition, plus a final networking stage.  We
then assess the extent to which they are evolving towards a collaborative – global
integration stage as envisonaged by the APEC Agenda.  Finally, we use a comparison
between the western and Asian approaches to draw conclusions regarding the role which
SMEs can play as the new growth agents in Asia.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK – AN EVOLUTIONARY, STAGE APPROACH
A number of models to explain the processes through which firms internationalise their
activities have been developed.  Following Coviello and McAuley 1993, these can be
categorised as the Foreign Direct Investment (economic efficiency) approach, the
Behavourial or ‘Uppsala’ school and the Relationship or Network school.  Each approach
starts from different premises regarding the rationale for international activities and each
has tended to be adopted by researchers from the different disciplines interested in
international business.  Despite these divided starting points, it will be argued here that
there are significant complementaries among these approaches and that they have tended
to converge into the network approach.  A synthesis of these approaches is shown in
Figure 1.
Most stage models commence with firms operating initially only with domestic sales.
Internationalisation often originates from an external force such as a proposal from a
3
client, distributor or government agency, or it may come from within the firm from the
owner / manager or another executive.  However, in the case of SMEs, the response of
firm’s management is crucial to assessing this proposal and building commitment within
the firm if it is to begin exporting (Buckley 1993: 94-96).
Vernon’s (1966) product life cycle theory is an early example of a stage model.  This
focused on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and large multinational firm behaviour. FDI
is regarded as a management intensive strategy which would appear to disadvantage
small firms where the availability of management skills, along with access to new
technology, access to market information and availability of finance are among the major
constraints on their capacity to internationalise.  However, they can offset this if their
owners and/or managers have sufficient entrepreneurial flair to guide their firm through
this process.  The SME literature focuses on the internationalisation stages prior to actual
foreign production, e.g. direct exports, use of foreign agents or representatives,
establishment of overseas sales and distribution subsidiary (Buckley 1993:94-95).  Small
firms’ choice of foreign market entry mode will reflect the transaction costs associated
with uncertainty and imperfect market knowledge and concerns about opportunism
inherent in foreign contracting arrangements.  They thus will often begin with short term,
direct export activities and progress to other mechanisms as these transaction costs fall
with experience (Meyanathan & Munter 1994: 5). These transaction costs are minimized
if small firms first enter ‘psychically’ (i.e. culturally) close markets and then move into
more distant ones.
While the economic efficiency / transaction cost approach has focused on the mode of
foreign market entry, the behaviouralist or Uppsala approach emphasised the parallel
need to build internal organisational capacity and structures and to incrementally increase
the proportion of the firm’s resources devoted to external activities to facilitate the move
into exporting (Welch & Luostarium 1988).  Cavusgil 1984 included pre-exporting stages
when applying the incremental Uppsala model to SMEs which can be measured by the
export to sales ratio in each stage – Stage 1: domestic market (ratio = 0); Stage 2 – Pre-
export (ratio = 0); Stage 3 – experimental involvement (ratio = 0-9%); Stage 4 – active
involvement (ratio = 10-39%); Stage 5 – committed involvement (ratio = 40%+).  Tests
of this stage theory using European time series data supported the stages approach as an
explanation of the internationalisation process for SMEs.  However, the process was not
smooth as some firms “leapfrogged” stages to move rapidly into Stage 5 while other
stopped their internationalisation process before reaching the final stage (Gankema, et al.
1997: 192).
The Uppsala model suggested that firms initially began their internationalisation process
by expanding into low risk activities such as indirect or contract exporting and then
increased their commitment of resources to the export market, cumulatively building up
their market knowledge and moving into more distant or risky areas until eventually
undertaking equity investments into offshore sales and manufacturing outlets or FDI
(Coviello & McAuley 1993: 226).  Western SMEs are thus modeled as moving
incrementally down stream (a) on the right side of Figure 1.  As will be discussed later,
Asian SMEs can be characterised as more commonly following stream (b).
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Networking refers to situations where firms act within a network of inter-organisational
and inter-personal relationships involving customers, suppliers, competitors, private and
public support agencies, family and friends.  It thus includes both formal and informal
connections between members of the net.  Firms invest to strengthen these relationships
rather than in overseas sales and production facilities.  These relationships are the source
of their international competitiveness.  Internationalisation occurs through external
activities with other members of the net rather than by internal organisation (Coviello &
McAuley 1993: 227).  One of the most commonly used conceptual bases for networks as
a means of international expansion is that developed by Johanson & Mattsson 1988.
They argue that internationalisation occurs as firms establish and develop positions in
relation to their counterparts in foreign networks by (1) moving into and establishing a
role in foreign networks (international extension or FDI); (2) penetrating foreign
networks by increasing their resource commitment and relationships with foreign firms
(collaboration); and (3) increasing the coordination of their positions in different nation
nets (international integration).
The international expansion of SMEs in network structures is less a reflection of strategic
choices aimed at minimizing production and transaction costs and capitalising on new
market opportunities than would be the case for large firms.  Rather it is a more ad hoc
process based on personal relationships and the qualities of the firm’s entrepreneur. This
does not negate the usefulness of the network approach for SMEs but  makes it more
difficult to specify simple conceptual expansion paths when analysing small firms
international behaviour.  Some small firms will follow the expected increment expansion
model but others will not.  High technology and ‘born global’ firms can complete the
process of moving into the stage of committed exporters in less than three years, omitting
steps in the process.  They may begin by establishing an agreement with an overseas
partner or agent in ‘psychically’ close markets as expected but then move quickly into
multiple entry modes and several ‘psychically distant’ markets, as shown by stream (c) in
Figure 1.  Rapid, successful international growth may also reflect the immediate use of
network mechanisms such as alliances, joint marketing and development agreements, and
joint ventures as shown by stream (d) in Figure 1 (Coviello & Munro 1997: 369-372).
Empirical research has generally supported the incremental approach to the
internationalisation of SMEs.  However, due to the central role of the firm’s decision-
maker as the arbitrator of the choice of market and mode of entry and the often pivotal
role of customers and governments in initiating export activity in SMEs, a variety of
paces and patterns are found in analyses of the internationalisation processes of SMEs in
western economies (see Dalli 1995;  Gankema, et al. 1997; Coviello & Munro 1997;
Chetty & Holm 2000).
Nevertheless, exporting by western SMEs is seen predominantly as an entrepreneurial
activity which reflects the capacities of the firms’ owner / managers.  Western SMEs are
exporters competing openly in international markets on the basis of their economic
efficiency or capacity to minimize production and transaction costs, and on their capacity
to continually undertake product, organisational and marketing innovations to remain at
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the forefront of their market areas.  Networking facilitates this internationalisation
process by providing SMEs with external access to the resources and competencies which
they cannot supply internally.  However, SMEs may choose to avoid collaborative
activities, preferring to remain in the earlier stages of stream (a) which affords them
greater control over the process.
The Asian Perspective
There is not a large Asian conceptual literature on the processes through which small
firms have internationalised their markets, at least in that material which is accessible in
English. Known works apply predominantly to large firms (see for example Kojima
1978; Ohmae 1987; Cho 1997).  However, they do adopt a stage perspective.  The stage
appproach fits the Asian academic tradition, being evolutionary and institutional, which
allow the role of large firms and Government policies as drivers of economic
development to be emphasised.  There is also a strong network element in the Asian
perspective, especially when analysing the role of small firms within client – supplier
relationships.
The Japanese model of flexible accumulation dominated Asian perspectives on SMEs in
the post-war period.  The core of this model is the subcontracting networks between large
and small firms.  The production of sophisticated manufactured products involves a large
number of processes prior to presenting a final good for sale.  In Japan, these are
organised as inter-firm transactional relationships rather than through vertical integration.
These relationships are typically organised into a multi-tier system where the parent firm
(assembler or trading house) has direct relationships only with a limited number of first-
tier subcontractors, these first-tier firms have direct relationships with the second-tier
subcontractors, these second-tier firms with the third-tier subcontractors, etc.  Generally,
higher tier subcontractors are medium-sized firms while lower tier subcontractors are
smaller, but this is not always the case (Itoh & Urata 1994:12).  The parent companies
provides their subcontractors with information and financial credit.  Technical support is
provided by the subcontracting parent firms, and by input and equipment suppliers (Itoh
& Urata 1994:32).  The subcontracting network expanded in the 1950s and 1960s with a
large number of spin-off firms established due to tax advantages given to firm owners
and employees were encouraged to set up separate firms which allowed parent firms to
reduce labour costs (Itoh & Urata 1998, 322-324).
Taiwan illustrates an alternative development model for Asian SMEs.  Small firms grew
rapidly in the immediate post-war period as manufacturers of simple products which were
produced on order for large Japanese trading companies or US-based electronics
multinationals.  The customer firm provided technology transfer and market access which
minimized the risks involved in operating in international markets.  The smaller firms
(operating as OEMs) proved to be low cost, flexible suppliers of mature technology
consumer goods, parts and standardised components.  Over time, these firms developed
independent design capabilities (ODMs) which meant that by the early 1990s, Taiwanese
firms dominated many of the mature technology segments of the consumer electronics,
personal computer and information technology industries.  However, only a small
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number of larger, global original brand name manufacturers (OBMs) based in Taiwan
operated in these industries (Hobday 1995:99-102).
The successful Taiwanese firms, rather than growing by vertical integration, established
local production networks comprised of other small firms involving manufacturing
subcontracting, distributors, designers, material and parts suppliers, machinery and
equipment producers, etc. which enhanced their capacities as low cost, flexible suppliers
(Chen & Chen 1998:451). The business strategies of Taiwanese SMEs have focused on
manufacturing while relying on cooperation with Japanese general trading companies,
multinational manufacturers and foreign importers to achieve overseas sales.
A Stage Model of Asian SME Development
These early stages of SME development in Asia are summarised in the first three stages
of Figure 2. The first three stages: petty producer / import substitution; dependency on
contracts to large firms; internalisation of mature technologies can be associated with
earlier standardised mass production systems of organisation (Cho 1997: 1096-1097).
Thus the petty producer / import substitution stage is associated with SMEs as
independent but domestically focused businesses, while the second stage characterises
SMEs as dependent subcontractors to large Japanese, US and European firms. These
firms supplied the SMEs with workforce training to ensure quality and delivery targets
were met, technical specifications, capital equipment and engineering support.  Local
innovations focused on incremental upgrading of the production process to improve
product quality and cost efficiency.  The more advanced SMEs also began to introduce
product design innovations initially based on imitation or reverse engineering and the
development of their own networks of SME suppliers to reduce costs. By the third stage,
some SMEs had developed into original design manufacturers which were able to
undertake unique design innovations and prototype development allowing them to
expand their product range in more of a partnership arrangement with their MNC
distributors.  However, they still relied on the larger firms for access to markets, key
components and capital equipment (Hobday 1995: 188-190).  It is hypothesised that this
process gave SMEs certain advantages in terms of their speed and flexibility capacities
which well positioned them to respond to changing market conditions.   However, they
also had inherent major deficiencies in technology, innovation and marketing which
inhibited their ability to become independent world traders on their own behalf.
The test of the resilience of the SME sector and of their capacity to internationalise their
operations came in the late 1980s and 1990s when structural changes arising from the
Japanese recession, together with appreciating local currencies and rising labour costs
upset the security of their position as contracted suppliers to successful large
multinational firms in the Asian region. Very few Asian small or even medium firms
were involved in international marketing under their own brand names, undertook
research and development or engaged in FDI up to the early 1990s (Hobday 1995: 190).
To successfully respond to such pressures, SMEs have to evolve through the last three
stages in Figure 2 which require them move into more independent internationalisation
strategies.  The externalization stage involves technology catch-up and niche production
where their main strategies are to secure spin-off or contract production against world
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competition or compete in smaller, differentiated product segments.  The localization
stage involves direct foreign investment to reduce labour costs and expand foreign sales
and the establishment of supply-based relationships with other small firms in a series of
foreign local markets.  The final stage involves the establishment of international
networks, as envisaged by the APEC agenda.  The network stage involves the
construction of linkages between domestic and foreign networks.  A fully developed
global SME network would include domestic networks of suppliers, designers and
service support firms in the home and other production base countries (localization stage)
linked into the international networks of partner SMEs which would provide channels for
imports and exports of parts and components and sales of final product both in their own
right and through partners in global markets.
Figure 2 thus involves an elaboration of stream (b) in Figure 1.  Asian SMEs initially
operated only in domestic markets (stage 1).  SMEs were then developed in response to
proposals to produce products, parts or components for MNCs moving into indirect
exports (sub-contracting) or contract exporting (OEM operations) under the patronage of
large firms (stage 2).  Higher tier and core SMEs developed their own technical and
design capabilities but still operated predominantly as suppliers to large companies (stage
3).
Faced with rising costs and a breakdown in this contract supply situation in the 1990s,
Asian SMEs responded in two ways.  Some firms which already operated in stage 3 could
begin to develop their own marketing capabilities, compete for spin-off production
contracts and start to sell to a broader range of customers under their own brand names.
This stage 4 response epitomizes the vision of SMEs as independent, international
competitors held by Asian Governments.  However, the more common response was for
SMEs to move production to lower cost offshore locations to serve home and contract
markets and, in some cases, to develop local supply networks in these host economies
(stage 5), but without first developing their own technical and independent marketing
capacities.  Ideally, these national supply and distribution networks could form the basis
of a globally integrated production and marketing system (stage 6).
All studies of SME development have to face the vexing question of size.  Definitions of
SMEs vary between Asian countries.  This paper relies on empirical studies undertaken
by local researchers in each of the case study countries who have applied their own
domestic definitions.  However, an over-arching definitional limit of 200 employees has
been applied to the more general analysis of their results.  More troublesome is the
problem that, as SMEs evolve through the latter stages of this model they often become
larger.  Thus the more successful SMEs may become defined out of the analysis, thus
biasing the results towards less dynamic firms.  However, the proportion of SMEs which
actually become large enterprises is very small and so the following analyses may be
taken as typical of the bulk of SMEs in each country.  Nevertheless, it is acknowledged
that case studies of the successful exiting firms would also be very illuminating.
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THE EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SMALL AND MEDIUM FIRMS
Mass Production Mode
As Japan provided the past model for Asian SME development, it is useful to briefly
examine how they have evolved through the stage framework developed above.  Small
and medium enterprises contribute a relatively large proportion of manufacturing
production and employment in Japan compared with other OECD countries.  In 1992,
they represented 99% of all enterprises and of manufacturing enterprises, and provided
79% of all employment and 74% of manufacturing employment.  They were most
prevalent in traditional small-scale industries such as leather, apparel, wood and wood
products, furniture and miscellaneous manufactures as well as in tertiary sectors,
particularly finance and insurance and construction (OECD 1997).
Traditional SMEs (Stage 1) are found particularly in rural areas and produce for local
consumption.  Protection and modernization of these firms has been a major element of
SME policy in Japan, typified by the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law, 1963.
They have been badly affected by the 1990s slump in domestic consumption in Japan and
are also facing increasing import competition from developing Asia.  Fighting for a
declining market, traditional SMEs are now engaged in strong price competition between
themselves, with ensuring bankruptcies and rising unemployment in regional areas (Iwaki
1992: 310-315).
During World War 2, subcontracting arrangements between small-scale parts suppliers
and large equipment assemblers were developed involving technical guidance and
cooperative arrangements as an alternative to vertical integration.  These arrangements
continued after the war, developing into the highly efficient modern Keiretsu
subcontracting system, popularised by the Toyota model of corporate organisation. . By
1981, 65.5% of SMEs in Japan were engaged in subcontracting as firms shifted out of the
traditional and local industries into the expanding subcontracting industries (Iwaki 1992:
333; Itoh & Urata 1998: 322-324).
This subcontracting system (Stage 2) was an essential element in Japan’s post war
export-led growth period.  Parent firms’ efficiency was improved through a division of
labour with suppliers which allowed each firm to specialise in their most efficient
activities, reduced cost of production especially for small batch specialised parts and
improved flexibility through an enhanced capacity to respond quickly to changes in
output and the avoidance of overly large, heirarchical organisational structures.  The
subcontractors gained technology, market information, training, access to specialised
equipment, managerial support and research and development at relatively low cost from
the parent.  However, there were some disadvantages where subcontractors were affected
more severely by market flucuations, were sometimes forced unilaterally to accept severe
business terms and suffered from poor managerial skills, low technology and lack of
equipment and trained personnel (Iwaki 1992: 342-343).
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Collaborative strategic arrangements between parent firms and first tier suppliers allowed
Japanese firms to undertake continuous product and process innovations which
maintained their role as leading world producers of sophisticated consumer durables.
Both types of firms had significant internal R&D capacities aimed at developing new
materials and products.  They also engaged in reverse engineering, joint technology
development, design and collaborative arrangements with other sources of technology
such as equipment suppliers and public research institutions.  Thus first tier suppliers,
who on average ranked as large to medium-sized firms had strong ODM capabilities and
operated in Stage 3 of Figure 2.  Small second and third tier suppliers had much lower
technical capacities and predominantly focused on achieving cost cutting production
improvements (Itoh & Urata 1994), thus continuing to operate in Stage 2.
Flexible Specialisation Mode
The breakdown of the Japanese subcontracting system has badly affected SMEs which
experienced reduced orders due to both the contraction of parent firms and import
competition (Sugiuwa 2000: 534).  The more technically advanced higher tier suppliers
have been able to take up the new global market opportunities and expand sales to non-
Keiretsu clients.  Lower tier suppliers have been under considerable pressure to lower
costs by parents but have not had sufficient capital to move offshore, with many forced to
close (Ernst 1997: 223).  Thus, only a small proportion of larger Japanese firms have
been able to respond to the new market opportunities and move into the externalization
stage (stage 4).
The Japanese government has an extensive range of programs to assist SMEs’ technology
development in the form of provision of preferential loans, preferential fiscal and tax
measures and provision of technical assistance in an attempt to upgrade their R&D and
technology capacities.  Most Japanese industries also have public technical support
centres which undertake contract R&D, exchange information with firms and
Universities and provide technical assistance to small and medium firms.  Generally,
smaller firms are relatively low users of these centres as their activities have been less
technically orientated.  However, there is evidence that a new group of Stage 4 SMEs
may be developing.  Some SMEs located near major urban areas are developing
collaborative arrangements (rather than hierarchical subcontracting) and have been able
to respond well to new urban consumption demands.  One study of non-contracting
SMEs reported that a large percentage of such firms relied heavily on external
researchers and public institutions to acquire technical information and know-how.  This
research was the basis for establishing new businesses and strengthening their current
product and processing activities to improve their competitive position (Sugasawa &
Liyanage 1999: 316-321).  Despite this, there has been a reduced rate of new business
start-ups in Japan with the overall numbers of SMEs declining due to the lack of venture
capital and managerial support for new SMEs operating outside the old Kieretsu
subcontracting system (Itoh & Urata 1994; Iwaki 1992: 307-327; Itoh & Urata 1998:
327-328; Sugiuwa 2000: 533-541).
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By the 1990s, over 80% of Japanese MNCs had reduced their use of Japanese sourced
components and parts in their overseas production facilities.  They established limited
local supply networks as the production capabilities of host country SMEs were not
considered  of international standard.  Their Japanese subcontractors were encouraged to
invest in overseas operations particularly in Malaysia, Thailand and China to supply these
overseas plants but also to export products back into Japan (Iwaki 1992: 347; Ernst 1997:
223).  However, it is estimated that less than 1 per cent of Japanese SMEs invest abroad.
Those that have indicated that managerial skills and support from associated firms were
the main factors which determined international success.  The main problems
encountered related to collection of local information, selection of appropriate local
partners, training of qualified staff, establishment of sales and distribution channels and
differences between local standards and institutional practices to those in Japan (OECD
1997: 189-191).  Thus, Japanese SMEs have only a limited involvement in localization
activities (Stage 5).  Japanese FDI by both large and small firms has been relatively
isolated from their host economies.  Overseas activities involved much higher levels of
vertical integration than found in Japan to ensure cost and quality controls.  However,
they are now under some pressure from host country governments to open their supplier
networks and localize component sourcing (Ernst 1997: 224).
Thus Japanese SMEs have remained predominantly in Stage 2 and this dependency
relationship with parent firms has characterised their operations both in Japan and
overseas.  A small number of first tier supplies and of new independent SMEs have been
able to upgrade their technological and marketing capacities and operate in Stage 4.  This
is now the focus of Japanese Government assistance to SMEs.  There is little evidence
that Japanese SMEs, despite some FDI, have developed localisation or global networking
characteristics.  The deficiencies inherited from the earlier, highly successful dependency
stage are the now the main factors inhibiting the internationalisation of smaller Japanese
firms.
DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWANESE SMEs
Mass Production Mode
Until the 1930s, Taiwan’s industrial sector consisted mainly of food processing,
particularly sugar.  Fertilizer, cement, paper, refineries, steel and machinery industries
were then established by the Japanese to support their Pacific war effort.  Taiwan was
decolonised in 1945 with 1945 – 1952 being a period of post-war reconstruction, with
policies primarily aimed at stabilizing the economy (Schive 1995: 6).
The 1950s featured import substitution strategies with inward- orientated policies such as
increased tariffs and import controls in order to protect local investment in light
manufacturing and discourage imports of consumer goods. SMEs began to be established
in these sectors as cottage industries to help absorb surplus labour in the rural areas.
However, the petty producer stage of SME development in Taiwan was relatively short.
By the late 1950s, the local market was showing signs of saturation, the country still had
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a significant surplus labour problem and, with US aid nearing an end, there was a need to
develop new policies. Economic reforms began in 1958 with corrections to the foreign
exchange rates, relaxation of import controls and a number of incentives including loans,
tariff rebates and tax concessions provided to encourage exports.  The enactment of the
Investment Law in 1960 authorised inflows of FDI, particularly into export processing
zones (Shive 1995: 7; Hu 1999: 6-8).
Taiwan’s electronics industry was initiated by this inflow of FDI from US and Japanese
MNCs which set up wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures to produce transistor
radios, black and white television sets and electronic components and parts.  While only
approximately 25% of the sector was based on foreign capital, this generated 60% of its
exports in the 1960s.  Local entrepreneurs began developing a comprehensive local
component supply industry and established their own assembly lines, quickly becoming
the centre of Taiwanese production (Chung 1997: 179). Taiwanese SMEs rapidly
developed an export orientation with their domestic sales falling from 47 per cent of total
sales in 1975 to 33 per cent in 1980 and to 29 per cent in 1985 (Chou 1992: 1076).
Thus the dependency stage of SME development in Taiwan was also relatively short and
these firms moved rapidly into the internalization stage with the rapid growth of OEM
and later ODM strategies as the dominant force in the sector. There was also an extensive
upstream supply network of component manufacturers.  By the 1980s, Taiwan’s leading
sectors were predominantly under indigenous control and the electronics industry
expanded rapidly in areas such as video games, Apple clones and IBM compatible
systems.  By 1995, Taiwan contributed over half the world’s supply of desktop and
portable computers, monitors, motherboards, keyboards, PC mice and switch power
supply units.  63% of its output was exported. Taiwanese firms, supported by public
research institutions, had developed a significant internal design capacity which allowed
them to rapidly move into new areas such as multimedia and video products.  However,
very little of this output was marketed under Taiwanese brand names, with the majority
of firms relying on OEM-ODM supply contracts for international sales.  Most SMEs
remained financially weak, lacked any major R&D activities and rarely undertook their
own marketing (Chung 1997: 181-183).
Exporters in other industries were also supported by efficient production networks which
comprised large numbers of highly specialised producers in sectors such as clothing, food
processing, metal working, furniture, auto components and chemicals.  Firms in these
networks were generally independent and competed against each other for contracts.
However, they shared production and market information which enhanced their
flexibility and capacity to respond to market changes (Chen 1998b: 36).  Again, core
firms in these sectors depended on contracts from MNCs and Japanese trading companies
for international sales and technology transfer, which meant their R&D and marketing
capacities were underdeveloped.
Taiwan’s export firms remained relatively small because they developed a structure of
local sourcing from other SMEs rather than vertical integration.  SME development was
assisted by active subcontracting and satellite-core relationships as discussed above.
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Why these industries developed with this structure is not easy to explain.  By the 1970s,
Taiwanese SMEs had proven they could compete equally with larger firms in terms of
cost and productivity.  They had advantages in having a more flexible set of technologies
based on labour-intensive operations and thus were more adaptable to external market
changes.  The relatively high interest rate prevailing during this time discouraged firms
from investing in non-essential areas such as advertising, information collecting and
additional operational units.  Markets were highly competitive and SMEs were prepared
to accept low profit margins.  Consequently, it appears export firms preferred to use these
local supply networks which offered lower costs and greater flexibility rather than
develop their own internal facilities.  In return, SMEs could use these contracts with
international assemblers and trading companies to reduce their investment requirements
and thus to continue to offer low cost supply (Schive 1995: 11-12).  Taiwan thus provides
the archetype of Stage 3 development in Figure 2.
Flexible Specialisation
By 1987, Taiwanese SMEs were feeling the full effects of the rising trade surplus which
had exerted considerable upward pressure on the domestic currency, rising labour and
land costs and increased import competition.  These factors initiated a division of labour
within Taiwanese firms with mature technology, labour-intensive operations moving to
Southeast Asia and China while more advanced firms were encouraged to develop high
technology and higher value added products locally.  SMEs account for varying
proportions of Taiwan’s high technology industries ranging from 100 per cent of firms in
medical instruments and equipment and other precision equipment, 97 per cent of
pharmaceutical manufacturing, to 80% of the aircraft and component parts industry.
SMEs spend slightly less on R&D and are only slightly less technology intensive than
larger firms in these industries (Schive 1999: 9-15).
Thus some, particularly medium-sized firms which produced a range of related products,
have been able to develop new markets by upgrading their Taiwanese operations
introducing greater automation, improved product quality and focusing on the higher
value added end of their product range.  These firms have been able to develop an
independent international market presence based on their OEM-ODM capacities,
competing for MNC subcontracts as these become more open. The Government now
requires such firms to commit to continued investment projects in Taiwan before
approving offshore operations for their labour-intensive activities (Chung 1997: 89-90).
Thus a significant component of the SME sector in Taiwan has been able to operate in
Stage 4 and benefit from the new market opportunities arising from the externalisation of
Japanese operations, with some growing to become larger international enterprises.
However, another common response by Taiwanese SMEs to these cost pressures was to
move production offshore in search of lower labour and land costs.  Cultural factors have
particularly led small firms to invest in mainland China, as well as Malaysia and
Thailand.  SMEs in labour intensive sectors such as apparel, leather and fur product,
wood and bamboo products, toys, sporting goods, plastic products, metal products,
electrical goods and electronic components moved production out of Taiwan between
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1987 and 1991.  Accelerating outward FDI caused upstream producers and suppliers to
follow.  At first, Taiwanese overseas subsidiaries attempted to duplicate the network
structures developed around these industries at home and otherwise relied on head office
to supply raw materials, components, parts and semi-finished products (Chung 1997:
168-173).  Production technologies were transferred overseas intact, although new
technologies, product design and innovation predominantly remained in Taiwan (Chen
1998b: 59).
However, by the mid 1990s, FDI was more often motivated by attempts to capture local
(host) market opportunities rather than cost cutting.  The proportion of sales into the host
market increased quickly at the expense of exports to third countries.  Smaller firms were
quicker than larger firms to exploit these local markets, which they found less
competitive than international markets and offering higher profit margins.  Local
sourcing also increased rapidly, at the expense of sourcing from Taiwan. Subsidiaries of
Taiwanese SMEs were quickly absorbed into local supply networks as the transactions
costs involved in maintaining Taiwanese supply relationships became too high.  Their
competitive edge over indigenous firms also quickly dissipated as they were too small to
set up their own subcontracting and suppliers networks and had to adapt to products
supplied by local firms.  Taiwanese SMEs had often used personal contacts to help their
entry into foreign markets and these same contacts resulted in their absorption into local
networks (Chen 1998b: 48-52).  Thus Taiwanese SME foreign investment rapidly
became a localisation strategy, with product increasingly focused towards foreign host
markets and local supply networks established involving some transplants but
increasingly local firms.  These firms have remained relatively small in size and their
local orientation has halted their evolution and integration into global networks.
Taiwan’s few large scale, multi-product manufacturers are beginning to develop
integrated production and marketing strategies among their international subsidiaries,
including alliances and joint ventures with overseas firms to set up high technology
manufacturing in Taiwan (Chung 1997: 190-191).  However, SMEs are yet to develop
integrated networking structures.  Their original Taiwanese networks were a major source
of competitive advantage as OEM-ODM supplies, and provided logistical support,
market information and technological assistance when FDI first occurred.  However,
these overseas operations have not been integrated into a global strategy.  Rather, as
discussed above, they are developing as national networks in host markets (Chen 1998a:
8-9).
Thus the network strategies of Taiwanese SMEs involve strong external network linkages
but weak internal linkages between subsidiary operations.  Strategic network linkages
involving business alliances pooling firm specific capabilities and complementaries occur
predominantly between large firms in high technology industries.  However, some
smaller firms with technological expertise or market power in niche markets also utilize
this approach.  Nevertheless, Taiwanese investments in Southeast Asia and China are
mainly based on relational networks or personal contacts which rely on trust as the basis
of inter-firm cooperation.  Such networks, however, tend to be location specific and
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hence are less useful as a means of expanding international activities and thus more often
lead to embedded localisation rather than globalisation (Chen & Chen 1998: 463).
SOUTH KOREA – FOLLOWING THE JAPANESE MODEL
Mass Production Mode
The Korean economy experienced severe disruption in the immediate post-war period
which badly affected its industrial base.  A truce in the Korean War was declared in July
1953.  This was followed by a period of stabilization and import substitution policies.  As
occurred in Taiwan, export orientated policies were introduced in the early 1960s and
SME production and exports grew quickly, particularly in the textiles and apparel sectors.
However, unlike Taiwan, the South Korean Government then instituted a policy of
industrial intervention which particularly favoured large assembly and later heavy
industrial firms.  Thus, in the 1970s, both the absolute numbers and relative position of
SMEs declined (Hong, et al. 1999: 6-7).
Korea’s large firms initially adopted a strong vertical integration strategy.  However, in
the 1980s, government policies promoted parts and component production, particularly
from SMEs, as a means of import substitution to offset the large trade deficit. Large
businesses faced labour shortages and rising wages at this time which increased their
subcontracting to SMEs (Abe & Kawakami 1997, 391-392).  The proportion of
manufacturing SMEs which are involved in subcontracting arrangements increased from
36.7% in 1981 to 48.5% in 1987.  However, the Korean subcontracting structure was
weakly developed compared to that in Japan, consisting of only one or two tiers (Itoh &
Urata 1998: 325-326).
Korean SMEs were enmeshed in highly dependent relationships not only with Korean
assemblers in the automobile and electronics industries for contracts but also on their
Japanese suppliers for essential parts, machinery and technical advice.  Consequently,
they had very limited product development and local product design capacities.  Other
difficulties which arose from this dependency included substandard quality of parts
produced in Korea, poor access to appropriate production equipment, inability to provide
appropriate support to other firms in the production chain and difficulties in accumulating
soft skills due to shortages of trained labour (Chon 1996: 107-110).  Korea’s dependency
on Japanese parts, intermediate products and know-how increased rapidly as it moved
into higher value products in the late 1980s (Kim & Nugent 1994: 18-19).
However, many Korean SMEs are still located in rural regions in traditional sectors such
as textile production.  These firms operate predominantly on orders from agents in a
virtual subcontracting relationship involving an ‘advance order’ or  ‘putting out’ system
either from large wholesalers or exporters in the cities or large local textile factories.
These traditional SMEs are operated by single entrepreneurs and can be a significant
source of indirect exports.  However, this process acts as a barrier between the small
firms and international market pressure, inhibiting their development of independent
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marketing or technical capacities which would allow them to evolve beyond stage 2
relationships (Han 1997: 213-231, Kim & Nugent 1994: 23).
Flexible Specialisation Mode
While South Korea has developed extensive programs of assistance for SMEs since the
promulgation of the ‘Small and Medium Industry Basic Law’ in 1966, most of this was
aimed at protecting the SME subcontracting system.  Large firms were able to deliver
substantial economic growth and were the focus of industry policy until after the July
1997 crisis.  Subsequently, the Government has looked to small firms as a new source of
growth but this has been hampered by the lack of technical and marketing skills in the
SME sector. The Korean government provides SMEs with financial support, fiscal and
tax incentives and technical guidance to encourage technology development.  Financial
support comes from sector-specific promotion funds and for specific R&D projects.  50%
of these program funds must be allocated to SMEs. One of the most serious bottlenecks
inhibiting technological development in SMEs in Korea was a shortage of technical
personnel. A number of institutions have been established to provide skilled personnel
and information to SMEs on technology development, including Regional Industrial
Technology Institutions which utilize a network of technical experts who can be assigned
to SMEs to provide long term assistance (Itoh & Urata 1998: 329-333).
The extent to which Korean SMEs have been able to develop new or original products
varies with sectors.  It is quite limited in sectors such as textiles, electronic parts and
components and automobile parts, where however firms are now attempting to upgrade
their technical capacities after a long period of dependence on Japanese suppliers.  By
contrast, the factory automation sector has successfully developed new products using a
variety of relationships with public R&D institutions, universities and international
agents (Kim & Nugent 1994: 13-20).
Localization is not prevalent among Korean SMEs, very few of which have undertaken
FDI.  Rather, the Government encouraged localization within Korea by assisting SMEs to
strengthen their capacities to operate as more independent OEM and ODM suppliers.
Since the 1990s, large Korean firms have been restructuring their production organisation
into a global model. This restructuring has involved inter-firm externalization and
specialisation whereby they devolve production of certain lines to new subsidiary firms,
spin-off divisions or subcontract to small firms.  This process required the creation of
more stable linkages between the firms involved. The density of these subcontracting
networks has increased with small firms producing 70 – 80% of their output through
subcontracting arrangements with other firms in 1990-91, twice the proportion of the
mid-1980s.  In Korea, government regulations stipulate conditions for transferring
business from large to small firms and control relations between large and small firms in
these networks (Cho 1997: 1093-1095).  In effect, this process involves assisting
subcontracting firms to evolve into Stage 3 relationships with their parent firms.
However, this approach was severely disrupted by the financial failure of many of the
chaebol companies after the 1997 crisis.  The Government is now looking to technology
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and knowledge based small  firms to emerge as the next wave of global competitors.  As
vast range of programs have been instigated to foster the grow of ‘promising’ and
‘technically advancing’ SMEs.  This indicates that generally the Korean SME sector has
not yet evolved beyond the externalization phase, with many still locked within the
second, or dependency phase.
MALAYSIA – APPLYING THE JAPANESE MODEL IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT
Mass Production Mode
Malaysia achieved independence in 1957.  At that time, the Chinese ethnic group
dominated small scale manufacturing as well as mining and the wholesale and retail
trades.  Malaysian SME policy between 1957 and 1985 was predominantly aimed at
encouraging Bumiputera (ethnic Malay) enterprise.  SMEs, regardless of ethnic
ownership, had an inward, domestic market orientation with low product quality and
technological capacity (Meyanathan & Salleh 1994: 31-32).
In the meantime, the Malaysian Government had adopted a relatively open policy to
foreign investment which saw the economy move away from resource-based industries
(rubber and palm oil plantations and tin mining) in the 1970s towards electronics and
electrical equipment, giving it a manufacturing export orientation.  In the 1980s, textiles
and clothing also became export orientated.  These sectors provided two-thirds of
manufacturing value added, 40 per cent of manufacturing employment and 80 per cent of
exports.  Malaysia offered foreign investors incentives including tax holidays, investment
tax credits, accelerated depreciation, export incentives and location incentives.  Exporting
firms tended to be large scale, foreign owned, enclave, and relatively capital and import
intensive.  They had few local economic linkages with little subcontracting or technology
transfer with local enterprises.  In 1983, the Malaysian domestic automobile industry was
established on a large scale with Proton developed as a joint venture between local and
foreign shareholders including Mitsubishi of Japan.  The relative significance of SMEs
declined during this period.  Although they increased in absolute numbers and
employment, larger enterprises expanded even more rapidly (Ariff & Ng 1998: 151-153;
Abdullah 1999: 24-31; Ahman & Zain 2000: 17).
After 1986, Government policy towards SMEs, regardless of ethnic ownership, changed
to recognise their having an essential role within the industrialisation process.  Part of the
new policy involved fostering strategic linkages between the export industries and local
SMEs.  Foreign firms were encouraged to develop subcontracting relationships,
particularly as they introduced more automated processes into their Malaysian operations.
These buyer firms initiated the subcontracting process by establishing supplier
partnership programs to develop long term relationships with suppliers, encouraged their
engineers to set up their own subcontracting businesses and transferred managerial and
technical know-how.  Proton also established a local vendor program to increase its local
content providing local subcontractors with technological support.  The Malaysian
system involved two subcontracting tiers.  The parents have targeted a few reliable first
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tier, medium-sized suppliers, and helped them upgrade their product quality to
international standards.  The second tier involves small firms which provide engineering
services.  In addition, two trading companies in furniture and food products have been
established to improve the marketing and productive capacity of other SMEs, resulting in
increased domestic sales against imports, government procurement contracts and some
exports of these products (Meyanathan & Sallah 1994: 50-53; Ahmad & Zain 2000: 16).
As already indicated, smaller Taiwanese firms moved to countries such as Malaysia in
search of lower labour and land costs, and have often become embedded in the  local
economy.   52 per cent of Taiwanese FDI projects in Malaysia were small-scale,
manufacturing electronics, basic metals and metal products, chemicals and textiles.
Larger projects have a clearer export orientation while smaller projects have targeted the
local market.  A number of Taiwanese SMEs entered Malaysia as satellite suppliers
producing components and parts which are sold to larger assembly firms for eventual
export to Taiwan and third countries.  These firms source around 40 per cent of their
inputs form Taiwan, although this proportion is declining as they become more
embedded in local networks (Ariff & Ng 1998: 154-158).
Flexible Specialisation Mode
Due to the enclave nature of export industries in Malaysia, few SMEs had the capacity to
develop as OEM-ODM enterprises.  The post-1986 policies aimed not only to expand the
number of SMEs by encouraging subcontracting and franchising but also to modernise
SME operations by providing financial assistance and promoting training, export and
research and development activities.  The proportion of local sourcing increased
significantly in the late 1980s, although this represented an increase in internal
integration as well as subcontracting.  Some examples of SMEs evolving through this
process, establishing their own subcontracting networks, developing independent
technical and design capabilities and gaining substantial world-wide export sales can be
cited.  However, for the majority of SMEs, poor product quality and lack of financial
resources remain fundamental problems, despite an extensive array of Government
assistance programs being available (Meyanathan & Salleh 1994).
It can thus be concluded that Malaysian SMEs after a long period as domestically
orientated petty producers are now entering the second stage as subcontractors to large
foreign and domestic assemblers in the electronics and automobile industries, and to
Government inspired marketing intermediatories in other sectors.  However, because
these parent firms operate in competitive international markets, this subcontracting
process must involve suppliers with world standard product quality and production costs.
A limited number of first tier subcontractors, with technical and managerial assistance
from their clients are now evolving through the OEM - ODM Stage 3 to become global
niche producer Stage 4.
18
CONCLUSION
As suggested in the conceptual framework, western SMEs tend to follow an
internationalisation process as depicted by stream (a) in Figure 1, with the expectation
that new globalising SMEs will utilize network mechanisms to increase the pace and
spread of destinations for their export activities.  Asian SMEs have followed stream (b)
which provided a stronger emphasis on indirect export activities and thus an easier and
quicker entry into international markets.  This process, elaborated in Figure 2, is also
expected to result in more direct exports by SMEs which can act on the opportunities
arising as Asian markets are opened to international competition.  However, when the
progress of SMEs in four major east Asian economies is plotted in Figure 2, it is clear
that they are unlikely to move into the final networking stage and that independent,
international marketing activity is exceptional.
Japanese SMEs, after proliferating within that country’s multi-tier subcontracting system,
have experienced great difficulty in meeting international competition.  Larger first-tier
firms which have already strong technological and organisational capabilities are the
exception.  Government policy is now focused on improving the technical and
managerial capacities of smaller firms so they can develop as Stage 4 firms.  Taiwanese
SMEs developed strong organisational and design capabilities as OEMs operating in
Stage 3 of the model.  Consequently, a higher proportion of these have been able to
upgrade their technological and independent marketing capacities and evolve into Stage
4.  Only large firms have developed collaborations and integrated marketing structures.
South Korean and Malaysian SMEs had relatively underdeveloped structures.  SME
policies in these countries is aimed at strengthening the density of local inter-firm
relationships and encourage SMEs with OEM-ODM (Stage 3) capabilities.  A few
exceptional firms have moved rapidly through this process and can now achieve some
international sales.
While Japanese and Taiwanese SMEs have invested off-shore, only the Taiwanese had
developed any significant linkages with local suppliers (Stage 5).  However, these firms
are in the more labour intensive and less technical product areas and have missed the
technological catch-up and managerial improvements associated with Stage 4.  Thus they
tend to become involved in local markets and embedded localisation which limits their
scope for international activities.  Only a few larger, export orientated projects have the
potential to become integrated into global production and distribution systems.
Thus, while small independent entrepreneurial western firms have been able to enter
global markets as niche producers only a few of the larger Asian SMEs have been able to
adopt this role.  This reflects the legacy of technical and managerial dependency inherent
in the Japanese model.  Nevertheless, the analysis of Asian SMEs provided here
highlights the pivotal importance of Stage 4 upgrading if SMEs are to be successful
independent international operators.  However, it is also at this stage where some firms
are likely to exit the model having grown to become large enterprises.  A rapid move into
the DFI stage as occurred with many Taiwanese SMEs appears to be a dead-end.
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Creating successful SME entrepreneurs, western or Asian, does not in itself imply a move
into collaborative relationships as this still rests predominantly on the preferences of the
firms’ owner / managers between collaboration and independent control.  Neither the
establishment of overseas production facilities nor collaborations guarantee a move into
globally integrated activities.  The scarce financial and managerial resources of SMEs
would seem to place such complex activities beyond the reach of all but the largest of
these firms.  Thus both the western and Asian analyses confirm that the focus of SME
policy should be on encouraging Stage 4 characteristics by upgrading the technological
and general managerial skills of SME entrepreneurs.
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Overseas Production Facility (FDI)
Figure One
A Synthesised Stage Model on Internationisation
Process in Western SMEs
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FIGURE TWO: FUNCTIONS OF SMALL FIRMS IN NETWORKED ORGANISATIONS
Mass Production
Mode
Stage/Function1 Japan Taiwan South Korea Malaysia
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1 Adapted from M.R. Cho (1997), pp. 1097-1099
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FIGURE TWO: FUNCTIONS OF SMALL FIRMS IN NETWORKED ORGANISATIONS (CONT’D)
Mass Production
Mode























































                                                          
2 Adapted from M.R. Cho (1997), pp. 1097-1099
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